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Trends in factor prices have recently figured prominently in the literature on globalisation 
in the late nineteenth century Atlantic economy. An important observation in this literature 
is the narrowing income gap between the Old and the New World in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. The guiding principle behind the division into the Old and New World 
was relative factor endowments. The New World had plenty of land but scarcity of labour, 
while the Old World had plenty of labour but scarcity of land.1 The well known 
globalisation story tells us that declining transport costs in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century made possible massive exports of agricultural products from the New to the Old 
World, which led to changed relative factor returns on land and labour. For land owners in 
the Old World, the inflow of cheap grains put downward pressures on their incomes, while 
exports of grain on a massive scale favoured the income growth for land owners in the 
New World. In a seminal article by O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson empirical trends in 
relative factor prices were represented by trends in wage-rental ratios for a number of 
countries.2 Their evidence showed that wage-rental ratios fell abruptly in the New World 
prior to World War I. The opposite happened in the Old World, where wage-rental ratios 
rose. The Old World sample was further divided so that countries entered into either a 
protectionist or a free trade group, the idea being that some Old World countries muted 
the forces of Globalisation by erecting tariffs on imports of grain. In protectionist 
countries wage-rental ratios should therefore have displayed a slower increase than in free 
trade countries. Sweden was classified as an Old World free trade country, whose wage-
rental ratio exhibited a markedly upward trend, as did wage-rental ratios in the other Old 
World free trade countries.  
The classification of Sweden as a free trade country defies what we know about 
Swedish trade policy.3 For example, from 1888 onwards Swedish grain tariffs were similar 
to those in Germany and France, both of which were classified as protectionist countries 
by O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson.4 So why did evidence show that the Swedish wage-
rental ratio behaved in a way more similar to free trade countries than protectionist ones? 
                                                 
1 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History. 
2 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence. 
3 Bohlin, Tariff protection in Sweden. 
4 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence, p. 54. 
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This article intends to resolve this seeming contradiction by documenting new evidence of 
Swedish land prices, indicating land rentals. The new series of land prices covers the years 
from 1877 to 1926, which means it captures the impact of late nineteenth century 
Globalisation, the advent of Swedish industrialisation and rapid economic growth, and the 
dramatic distributional changes associated with World War I. It omits though the impact of 
the new era in Swedish agricultural policy, involving trade regulations and subsidisation, 
which commenced in 1933. 
We begin the article by discussing the new series of land prices and offer our criticism 
of the series used by O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson. To build up a new picture of the 
Swedish wage-rental ratio requires also representative series of wages for either agricultural 
or industrial workers. We document the wage series at hand and discuss if the application 
of an agricultural or industrial wage series as a numerator in the wage-rental ratio makes a 
difference. Until World War I agricultural and industrial wages increased at about the same 
rate. However, in the aftermath of the war agricultural and industrial wages set out on 
different courses in the 1920s; for this period, the wage rental ratio increases more if we 
use industrial wages in the numerator. When we use our new series of land prices, the new 
Swedish wage-rental ratio displays a slower increase than the wage-rental ratio documented 
by O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, whether computed by an agricultural or industrial 
wage series in the numerator. The Swedish wage-rental ratio evolves similarly to that of 
other Old World protectionist countries’, which is more in harmony with the Swedish 
protectionist turn in 1888. 
Using economic theory and stylised facts about long-term economic development we 
argue that the wage-rental ratio tend to increase in developing economies such as Sweden 
at the end of the nineteenth and the entire twentieth century. The key to understand short-
term fluctuations in the wage-rental ratio lies in the movements of land prices. We 
therefore turn to a discussion about the determinants of land prices. More specifically, we 
explore the effects of agricultural productivity increase and commodity prices on the 
evolution of land prices. The terms of trade developed favourably for the agricultural 
sector in the decades preceding the First World War, and we ask to what extent the price 
increase for agricultural products were caused by tariffs and a change of the product mix 
from grain to animal products in the agricultural sector. 
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2. Documentation of new land prices 
There are two sources for documenting the evolution of Swedish land prices. Both were 
presented by Åmark in a monograph commissioned by the public investigation 
committee devoted to exploring the effects of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century protectionism.5 The first source is a series of Crown land leases per hectare in 
1861–1913.6 The authors of National Income of Sweden 1861–1930 extended the series 
to 1930 and capitalised it to land prices by applying an interest rate of five percent.7 
O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson used that series to compute the Swedish wage-rental 
ratio.8 The other source is a series of sales values of private land between 1876/78–
1918/20. As far as we know this series has neither been used nor commented upon in 
any scholarly work since it saw the light of day. Complementing sales values of private 
land appeared in yet another public investigation in 1930, extending the series of private 
farm sales values to 1926.9 Accordingly, we have information on both measures of land 
prices only from 1877 to 1926. The series of private land prices and Crown land leases 
are displayed in figure 1. There are two differences that warrant our attention: firstly, 
Crown land leases fell more abruptly during the agrarian crises in the 1880s; and 
secondly, private land prices grew more briskly during World War I. As the two series 
display markedly different behaviour, it is necessary to determine which one of them 
should be used in computing the Swedish wage-rental ratio. This requires a minor 
digression on the judicial status of land. 
(GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Three types of landownership existed in Sweden at the end of the nineteenth century, three 
juridical categories rooted in the Middle Ages. Private land was owned by freeholders who 
paid taxes to the Crown (skattejord). Crown land was leased by tenants who paid land dues 
to the Crown as rent (kronojord). Tax exempted land was owned by rich peasants and 
noblemen and was cultivated by tenants who paid rents to the owner (frälsejord). Around 
1700, these categories of land made up more or less equal shares of the total arable area. 
                                                 
5 Åmark, Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdena. 
6 Åmark, Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdena, p. 27, table 8. 
7 Lindahl, Dahlgren and Kock, National Income, II, p. 393, table 126. 
8 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence. 
9 Höijer, P.M. angående jordegendomsvärdenas förändringar fram till år 1928, p. 121. 
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However, at the end of the nineteenth century, the proportions of each category of land 
had changed considerably. In 1878, 60 percent of the land was owned by freeholders, while 
the share of Crown land was merely eight percent.10 Here is the first clue as to why the 
series representing the leases of Crown land in this period is unrepresentative for the 
evolution of land prices in Sweden. 
There are at least two more arguments against using the series of Crown land leases as 
indicative of the evolution of sales values in the private land market. First, the farms leased 
on Crown land were in general exceptionally large. While the most common size class for 
private farms was 5–10 hectares in Åmark’s sample, the average Crown land unit was larger 
than 50 hectares, and if we include forest land, they were larger than 90 hectares. Second, 
as the terms of the leases were long (20 years) any potential user of land had to take into 
careful consideration any anticipated change in legislation regarding their disposal rights 
over the land they leased. The most important change in legislation that affected the value 
of the leases came in 1882, severely curtailing the Crown land tenants’ right to exploit 
forest land. Essentially, tenants were only allowed to exploit forest land to collect firewood 
for household requirements after 1882. That permission was besides gradually restricted in 
the 1890s.11 Åmark tried to remove the influence of the changed legislation by only using 
arable land and meadows reduced to arable when calculating Crown land leases per hectare. 
He nevertheless acknowledged that the much more precipitous decline of Crown land 
leases in the 1880s, compared to sales values of private land, reflected the changed forest 
legislation. 
Since Crown land leases give arguably a distorted picture of the evolution of sales 
values in the overall land market, we turn now to Åmark’s investigation of private sales 
values. Åmark’s series of private sales values was constructed from a sample of 4,854 
sales transactions. He presented the series in three-year averages stretching from 
1876/78 to 1918/20. The geographical area covered by the investigation was confined to 
counties in central and southern Sweden.12 The investigation further excluded farmlands 
smaller than 5 hectares, and farms with forestland and pasture that were more than three 
times the size of the arable. The number of purchases varied a lot by the size of the 
arable. Purchases of farmlands with more than 100 hectares of arable do not figure 
                                                 
10 Gadd, The agricultural revolution in Sweden. 
11 Åmark, Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdena, pp. 24–6.  
12 The investigation included the counties of Östergötland, Halland and Skaraborg. 
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prominently in the sample; in some locations and years, there were only a few purchases 
of properties of that size.  
(GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE) 
In figure 2 we present four separate series of farm prices by size class. The small and 
medium-sized farmlands had a more favourable development of sales values than the large 
and very large farmlands. Small farms relied heavily on family labour. The evolution of 
sales values on farms above 50 hectares that relied on hired labour should be more 
indicative of the evolution of land rentals. If we disregard the series of farms above 100 
hectares, all series of land prices show nevertheless the same general contour of 
development. 
We have scanty information about the way land prices have been collected for the years 
after 1919. All we are told by Höijer is that the sales values were collected in a way that 
would make them comparable to Åmark’s investigation.13 
3. Documentation of wages  
3.1 Agricultural workers 
Agricultural wage earners did not represent a homogenous group of rural workers. At 
least three broad categories of workers can be distinguished, the largest of which 
consisting of day-workers. They were people who were either landless or owners of a 
parcel of land insufficient to provide them with incomes above subsistence. They 
worked for peasants or nobles. Those workers made up a growing relative number of 
the rural working class, amounting to 46 percent in 1870/80 and 50 percent in 1920/30. 
As day-workers were largely paid in cash, assessments of wage increases for 
agricultural workers often refer to this specific category of workers. Day-workers had 
the freedom to work wherever they found appropriate, in contrast to farm servants, 
whose efforts were guided by the Domestic Servants Act, constraining their freedom of 
movement. Domestic farm servants were paid an annual or monthly cash wage with free 
board and lodging. Lack of freedom also concerned another class of workers, namely 
the so-called statare, who worked for nobles on large estates. They were paid a fixed 
annual cash wage with free housing and benefits in kind (stat).  
                                                 
13 Höijer, P.M. angående jordegendomsvärdenas förändringar fram till år 1928, p. 121. 
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(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Our knowledge of wages for agricultural workers stems from compilations made by the 
authors of the voluminous Wages in Sweden, based on market price scales (markegångstaxa) 
for pre-1913 years and wage material by the Social Board thereafter. 14 The most 
homogenous wage series represents day-rates for day-workers, a series that was used by 
O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson to compute the Swedish wage-rental ratio.15 However, 
reductions in working hours make it problematic to take that series to represent the growth 
of wages in agriculture for an unaltered unit of labour input. It is well known that although 
the time at which reductions occurred varied by geographical area, there was a gradual 
shortening of the working day. Reductions concerned only working hours during the 
summer, while working days during winter remained quite stable before the 1930s, since 
daylight acted as a check on the elasticity of working hours. In all likelihood no substantial 
reductions in working hours took place before the 1870s, implying that people spent on 
average 14 hours a day at work, including breaks. As the 1920s drew to a close, the norm 
was approaching ten hours a day during summer time. If we take further account of 
unaltered working hours during winter, roughly half of the year, the reduction amounts to 
two hours in sixty years. After adjusting the growth of daily wages to reductions in working 
hours we are left with a wage series of agricultural workers that increases somewhat faster 
than the series used by O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson. Later in this article we will use 
our modified series of daily wages as a numerator when computing the new Swedish wage-
rental ratio.  
These adjusted day-rates cannot simply be grossed up to annual incomes as many day-
workers had at their disposal a small piece of land for horticulture and small scale farming. 
Furthermore, in off-seasons many of them were employed in above all lumbering. That 
makes it difficult to compare day-workers day-rates to annual wages for farm-servants and 
statare. Jungenfelt, in his pioneering study of the share of wages in national income16, tried 
nevertheless to construct a general series of annual wages for agriculture. We will 
counterpoint below his annual series with the annual wage series for manufacturing 
workers when computing the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing wages. 
                                                 
14  Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, II, p. 113, table 169, p. 152, table 180. An 
identical series of wages for day workers also appears in Jörberg, A history of prices in Sweden I, pp. 
710–14. 
15 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence. 
16 Jungenfelt, Lönernas andel av nationalinkomsten, p. 104. 
Jan Bohlin and Svante Larsson: Protectionism, agricultural prices and relative factor incomes 
 
7 
3.2 Manufacturing workers 
Information on wages of manufacturing workers did not find its way into official statistics 
until 1913, when the Social Board began its annual report, implying that assessments of 
wage behaviour rest on quite scanty grounds pre-1913. Before further efforts have been 
made to dig into archives for more information, we have once again to resort to the wage 
series that appeared in Wages in Sweden.17 The wage material there was mainly collected from 
firms whose wage records had been kept and preserved for a period long enough to make 
them worth extracting. From each firm’s wage record, wage series of a small number of 
workers from representative occupations were collected and combined into occupational 
averages. That method probably tracked changes of wages from one year to another better 
than it pinned down actual levels. Many of the wage series in Wages in Sweden, both the 
aggregate, the regional and the occupational ones, have of course been subjected to 
scrutiny by Swedish economic historians.18 It has for instance been objected that the 
omission of temporary workers renders the wage series in Wages in Sweden questionable, but 
no attempts have so far been made to construct a new national series of wages pre-1913.19 
For industrial workers two series are presented in Wages in Sweden, the first of which 
represents hourly wages, the preferred measure when studying the rate of change for an 
unaltered unit of labour input. The other series represents annual wages. After 1913, the 
Social Board collected wage data, and the authors of Wages in Sweden used this source to 
construct a wage series that could be linked to their pre-1913 series.20  
International wage comparisons rely in many instances on samples of so called urban 
unskilled wages, and most commonly on wages for construction workers, because of data 
abundance and a fairly homogenous wage structure. For Sweden, though, wage data for 
unskilled construction workers are comparatively scarce pre-1913.21 Furthermore, few wage 
series of unskilled workers in manufacturing exist for the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, which means that it is difficult to tell with certainty whether the skilled-unskilled 
                                                 
17 Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I. 
18 Gustafsson, Den norrländska sågverksindustrins arbetare; Berglund, Industriarbetarklassens 
formering; Cornell, Sundsvallsdistriktets sågverksarbetare; Johansson, Glasarbetarna. 
19 Gustafsson, The industrial revolution in Sweden. 
20 Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I, pp. 260–1, table 26. 
21 As construction workers were largely paid by piece rates, preserved records of hourly wages were 
more difficult to come by and thereby excluded from the investigation by Bagge, Lundberg and 
Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I, p. 8. 
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pay ratio exhibited any upward or downward trend.22 The Swedish wage series presented by 
Williamson in his widely cited article from 1995 probably overestimated the growth of real 
wages by being based, pre-1888, on merely four series of unskilled occupations whose 
wages grew faster than those for manufacturing workers in general.23 We do not know 
whether a series of urban unskilled workers would deviate from our series of wages in 
manufacturing. To stand on safe ground, we stick to the series from Wages in Sweden 
representing wages of manufacturing workers as a whole, a series that captures our present 
state of knowledge of wage behaviour in manufacturing. We seek a representative measure 
of the development of wages in sectors other than agriculture, and the series of 
manufacturing wages serves this purpose.  
3.3 Ratio of agricultural to manufacturing wages 
The wage-rental ratio can be computed by using either agricultural or manufacturing 
wages as a numerator. Thus, the relative movement of wages in the two sectors matters 
for our interpretation of the wage-rental ratio. Furthermore, the movement and 
magnitude of the ratio of wages for agricultural to industrial workers is an important 
component in the transition from agriculture to industry. For rural workers it represents 
the opportunity cost of staying in agriculture. As agricultural workers were above all 
attracted to unskilled jobs in manufacturing, their wage levels should preferably be 
compared to wage levels of unskilled manufacturing workers. The ratio of unskilled 
manufacturing to agricultural hourly wages fluctuated between 2 and 2.5 until the 
1890s. It then started to contract slowly until shortly after World War I, when the ratio 
was substantially enlarged.24 After being quite tightly coupled together, hourly wages in 
industry and agriculture set out on different pathways in the aftermath of World War I. 
The nominal income gap between agricultural and urban workers does not translate to a 
commensurate real income gap, however, since it is likely that rural dwellers had access 
to cheaper food and housing. As time went by industrialisation and urbanisation drove a 
wedge between farm gate and retail prices as processing and marketing made food in 
urban areas more expensive than agricultural products in rural areas. That promoted a 
                                                 
22 Larsson (Globalisation, inequality and Swedish catch up) shows that the few existing wage series of 
skilled and unskilled workers indicate a stable skilled-unskilled pay ratio.  
23 Williamson, Evolution of global labor markets. 
24 Larsson (Globalisation, inequality and Swedish catch up) has on the basis of the few skilled and 
unskilled wages series in Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I–II, estimated that the 
unskilled-skilled pay ratio in industry was on average around 84 between 1860–1912. 
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contraction of the real wage gap. Besides, the annual wage gap was smaller because of 
longer working days in agriculture, and it did not swell after the war because of heavy 
reductions in working hours in industry.25  
(GRAPH 3 ABOUT HERE) 
4. Theory: what determines the wage-rental ratio? 
The wage-rental ratio is a quotient that shows the evolution of the relative reward per unit 
of input accruing to labour and landownership. In an economy without technical progress 
an increase of labour per unit of land leads to diminishing returns, increasing the relative 
reward to landownership. The classical economist Ricardo was more concerned with 
extensive diminishing return that would occur when, because of increasing population 
pressure, land of lower fertility was brought into cultivation. The world of the classical 
economists was inhabited by three classes: landowners, capitalists and workers. Land was 
leased by capitalist tenants who employed workers to cultivate it. In competitive 
equilibrium the capitalist tenant on marginal land expected to earn the same rate of return 
on his investment as in every other sector of the economy. When less fertile land was 
brought into use competition between capitalist tenants would therefore lead them to bid 
up land rents for owners of infra-marginal land. Otherwise expressed, a more fertile piece 
of land could fetch a higher sales price than a less fertile land of the same size. The classical 
theory of rent was at heart a theory of differential rent; there was no rent on marginal land. 
Ricardo’s pessimistic conclusion was that land rents would swallow an ever increasing share 
of national income, while workers’ wages would in the long term stagnate at subsistence 
levels because of Malthusian population pressures. The classical prognosis was that the 
wage-rental ratio would fall. 
The dismal vision of the classical economists turned out to be false. Importation of 
cheaper food and above all technical progress neutralised the forces of diminishing returns. 
Industrialisation and concomitant productivity increase have also led to increasing real 
wages. In the long run, real wages have increased more or less at the same rate as labour 
productivity; the deviation around the long-term trend is explained by intermittent changes 
in the income distribution between wages and profits. Since the income elasticity of food is 
                                                 
25 Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson (Wages in Sweden, I, p. 253) report that marked reductions in 
working hours occurred in 1918–20. In 1920, hours of work were restricted to 48 hours per week in 
the manufacturing, commerce and transport sector. 
Göteborg Papers in Economic History no. 7 
 
10 
less than unity, the share of agriculture in the economy decreases with economic progress 
unless neutralised by increased net exports. Moreover, available data from developed 
countries show that over a long period of time, at least in the twentieth century, the growth 
of wages has by far outstripped the growth of land rentals.26 This is also what we would 
predict from theoretical reasoning. 
A capitalist tenant expects the same rate of return on his investment as in any other 
sector. The rental that a tenant would be prepared to pay to a landowner is therefore 
obviously dependent on the yield of the rented land. The larger the difference between the 
yield per land unit and the required rate of return, the more he is willing to pay in rent. It is 
a stylised fact of economic growth that the rate of return shows no long-run trend.27 
Therefore, the rate of growth of real rentals is dependent on the rate of growth of yield per 
land unit. The latter in its turn is dependent on the rate of growth of sales revenues minus 
the rate of growth of costs. The growth of sales revenues per land unit is the sum of 
growth in prices and volume. To better explore the role of productivity change for the 
evolution of land rents we assume in the following discussion that prices of agricultural 
products stay constant.  
The most important cost item for agriculture is wages. It seems reasonable to assume, 
and it accords well with facts, that agricultural wages grow at about the same rate as in 
other sectors of the economy. Another stylised factor of economic growth is that the 
income distribution between wages and profits has stayed constant in the long run, which 
means that wages tend to grow at the same rate as average labour productivity in the 
economy. Economic growth is the sum of the growth in labour inputs and the growth in 
labour productivity. Since the late nineteenth century the growth in labour productivity has 
been much larger than the growth in labour inputs. Accordingly, in developed economies 
the growth in the wage rate, being approximately equal to the growth in labour 
productivity, will not fall much short of the growth in GDP. It certainly grows faster than 
the growth in agricultural output. What does that mean for land rents? Since agricultural 
output grows considerably slower than GDP, labour productivity in agriculture must grow 
                                                 
26 See for example Lindert, Land scarcity, p. 860. From 1900 to 1970 real farmland value per acre in the 
USA grew by 1.1 percent per annum (Lindert, Long-run trends, pp. 50–1, table 1), while real wages of 
unskilled workers grew by 2.1 per cent per annum over the same period (Williamson, Evolution of 
global labor markets). Federico also documents substantial increases in the wage-rental ratio for 
various Western European countries in the period 1870–1938, see Federico, Feeding the World, p. 
239, table III. 
27 Kaldor, Capital accumulation and economic growth. 
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much faster than productivity in the overall economy for land rentals to grow at the same 
rate as wages. 
To better understand the argument it is useful to give a numerical example. We take 
our departure from the following equation: 
(1) pyY wL rK= +  
where py=price index of value added, Y=volume of value added, w=wage rate, L=number 
of labour units, r=rate of return on capital invested in farms, K=volume index of farm 
capital (land, buildings, equipment etc.). 
Equation (1) is an accounting identity which says that the value of output can be 
dissolved into payment for the various inputs: wages for employed workers and rentals per 
hectare for owners of farmlands. 




p w L r Ka b
p Y w L r K
Y ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ = + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
? ?? ? ??
 
where a and b are cost shares and the dots stand for time derivatives. 
Equation (2) tells us that if prices stay constant, the rate of growth of output is a 
weighted average of the rate of growth of factor inputs and factor payments. 
Let us imagine that GDP grows at three percent per year and that two-third of this 
growth is due to labour productivity. Accordingly, wages will grow by two percent per year. 
If we for example assume an income elasticity of demand for food of 0.5, agricultural 
output will grow by 1.5 percent per year. In this example we furthermore assume that the 
share of wages is 0.5. If land rent on a given piece of land is to increase at the same rate as 
the wage rate, the labour force must decline by one percent, or otherwise expressed, labour 
productivity must rise by 2.5 percent. In that case the share of land rentals in agricultural 
value added would rise, since labour input diminishes while the input of land stays intact. If 
labour productivity growth is the same as the growth in wages, rentals would grow at the 
same rate as output, by 1.5 percent, keeping constant the income distribution between 
wages and rents. If labour productivity growth is lower than the growth of wages, rentals 
must grow slower than output and the income distribution would be tilted in favour of 
wages. The historical record shows that labour productivity in agriculture has not grown 
Göteborg Papers in Economic History no. 7 
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faster than labour productivity in the overall economy.28 Hence, if the agricultural terms of 
trade do not continuously increase to compensate for lower output growth, we would 
expect the growth of rentals to lag behind wage growth. 
Even though we would expect the wage-rental ratio to increase with economic 
development, its short term variations, or rather the variations in its denominator, land 
rents, were of great concern to contemporaries in a society where agriculture still 
contributed 25 percent of national income and where 40 percent of the labour force was 
employed in the agricultural sector. We now continue our discussion of what determines 
land rents and land prices. 
Theoretically, as for any asset, the price of a piece of land is nothing but the future 
stream of income from owning it discounted to present value by applying a suitable rate of 
interest. Accordingly, land prices serve well as an indicator of land rentals. Experience from 
asset markets shows that expectations of future incomes tend to be heavily influenced by 
recent experiences. Therefore, if income from owning land is on the rise, land prices will 
rise too. If buyers of land expect that land prices will continue to increase in the future, 
land prices may run ahead of rents for speculative reasons, but in the long run they would 
on average follow each other closely. To understand the evolution of land prices we 
therefore have to understand the variables that determine the income of land owners. An 
important determinant of farmer’s revenues is obviously the prices of agricultural goods. 
The revenue of the farmer though is not only determined by what prices he gets but also 
by how much he sells. In other words, if he can raise the monetary value of his output by 
reallocating his product mix in the direction of more income elastic goods, and if he can 
raise productivity by means of technical progress, his revenues will rise.  
Landowners’ income is determined both by revenues and costs. The most important 
costs to consider are wages for agricultural workers and purchased inputs. However, the 
effect of agricultural wages on land prices is not so clear-cut. On the one hand, a rise in 
agricultural wages would increase the cost of hiring labourers. This would affect the 
income of large landowners negatively, relying heavily on hired labour. On the other hand, 
as a majority of farms were small family farms, who only sparingly relied on hired labour, it 
might be argued that for owners of family farms it did not matter whether incomes derived 
                                                 
28 To give an example: between 1890 and 1970 agricultural labour productivity in Sweden increased by 
2.3 percent per year, while it grew by 2.9 percent per year in manufacturing and 2.3 per year in the 
overall economy. Calculated from data presented by Edvinsson, Growth, Accumulation, Crisis. See 
www.historia.se. 
Jan Bohlin and Svante Larsson: Protectionism, agricultural prices and relative factor incomes 
 
13 
from imputed payments to their own labour or from rewards to their landownership. What 
was important for family farms was their total income. Therefore, if agricultural wages 
increased they might have been inclined to accept a lower rate of return on their farm 
capital than large landowners and be willing to bid up land prices. 
Purchased inputs were another cost item for farms, although they were less important 
than wages since they only constituted 15 percent of final sales value. Most of the inputs 
emanated from the industrial sector, so an increase in industrial prices should lead to 
increased costs per unit of output for the farmers.  
From the above deliberations we may conclude that in order to explore the evolution 
of farm prices we should look at the evolution of agricultural and industrial prices, 
agricultural wages and agricultural productivity. We have already dealt with wages. In the 
following two sections we take a closer look at commodity prices and agrarian productivity. 
5 Commodity prices 
5.1 Agricultural prices 
The invasion of imported grain into Western Europe following the US civil war put 
downward pressure on agrarian commodity prices. In Sweden, as in many countries on 
the European continent, landowners succeeded in their campaign for grain tariffs. 
Therefore, from 1888 onwards the prices of arable products developed more favourably 
for Swedish farmers than world market prices for grain. In addition, the index of 
agrarian prices includes animal products whose prices developed more favourably than 
grain prices from the mid-1880s, as figure 4 shows.29 In this period Swedish farmers 
expanded production of animal products while the output of arable products stagnated; 
between 1870 and 1913 the volume of animal produce grew by 2.3 percent per year, 
while arable produce declined by 0.2 percent per year.30 The overall index of agrarian 
prices thus captures the effects of the transition from arable to animal products. As we 
argue below, the change in the output mix of the agricultural sector from arable to 
animal produce was more important for the favourable price trend than grain tariffs. The 
                                                 
29 The separate series of animal and arable products do not appear in Schön, Historiska 
nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk. Instead the separate series were provided by the author on 
request.  
30 Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk.  
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more favourable price trend for animal products was intensified during the First World 
War when agrarian prices soared. 
(GRAPH 4 ABOUT HERE) 
5.2 Industrial prices 
The weighing of all manufactured goods into an aggregate measure to represent the 
overall movement of prices for manufactured goods poses a great challenge; the index 
number problem is present all the way. Works within the field of Swedish Historical 
National Accounts (SHNA) provide plenty of price series for manufactured goods, 
especially after 1885.31 Edvinsson, in his contribution to SHNA, argues persuasively 
that when possible we should use chained Paasche and Laspeyres indices combined into 
an ideal Fisher index.32 That requires annual current values of production for each item. 
Thanks to the Swedish Census of Manufactures, these are readily available for most 
goods, so there is no reason why some kind of ideal solution to the index-number 
problem should not be applied.33 One of the present authors has carried this approach 
still further for manufactured goods by including more price series, but only in a series 
that stretches up until 1912.34 The rest of the period is covered by Edvinsson’s series.35 
Prices fell from a peak in 1874 to a trough in 1887, and recovered slowly until 1915. 
The impression one gets of these pre-war decades is nevertheless one of price stability 
as regards industrial goods. The high rate of inflation during World War I brought a 
dramatic increase in prices of manufactured goods; the index rose from 100 in 1915 to 
334 in 1920. Prices then dropped to more moderate levels. 
5.3 Agricultural terms of trade  
In Sweden, as in most other countries, the two decades preceding World War I were in 
Federico’s words a ‘veritable golden age’ for farmers. 36  The terms of trade for Swedish 
                                                 
31 Ljungberg, Priser och marknadskrafter; Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Industri. 
32 Edvinsson, Growth, Accumulation, Crisis. Previous authors contributing to SHNA have used so-
called deflation periods, i.e. fixed weights for periods of 20–25 years. The present authors side with 
Edvinsson that as long as there are annual current production values at hand chained Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices combined into a Fisher index provide the ideal solution to the index number problem.  
33 Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik, D. Fabriker och manufakturer. 
34 Larsson, Estimates of employment. 
35 www.historia.se. 
36 Federico, Feeding the World p. 23. 
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farmers (agricultural prices/industrial prices) improved by 75 percent between 1897 and 
1915. This improvement of the terms of trade was fundamentally driven by price increases 
for agricultural goods, especially animal products, while manufactured goods prices 
remained fairly stable. If we look only at animal products, the terms of trade improved by 
85 percent, while for arable products the terms of trade improvement were 48 percent. 
World War I and its aftermath brought extreme conditions in commodity markets. At the 
initial stages of high inflation agricultural prices increased faster than industrial prices, but 
they also fell deeper in the deflation that set in once the war had ended, which adjusted the 
terms of trade downwards to its pre-war levels.  
Figure 6 demonstrates that land prices followed agricultural prices closely. 
However, the swings in land prices were not as pronounced as those in agricultural 
prices. When agricultural prices declined precipitously in the 1880s and in the deflation 
after World War I, land prices did not follow suit, and when agricultural prices rose 
during the war land prices did not rise to the same extent.  
(GRAPH 5 ABOUT HERE) 
(GRAPH 6 ABOUT HERE]) 
6. Productivity in agriculture 
It would be possible to obtain estimates on the evolution of labour productivity in 
agriculture since we have time series data on value added37 and employment38. However, 
the employment figures which derives from the population censuses held every tenth year 
are of dubious quality. Population census registered people by occupation, but it is well 
known that many of those classified as employed in agriculture performed other tasks such 
as rural handicrafts at least part of the year. Employment varied seasonally in agriculture. It 
is fair to say that we simply do not know the accurate number of full time employed 
agricultural labourers. Underemployment in the countryside is likely to have been 
prevalent, even though it declined as industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded. The 
accuracy of official employment statistics improves gradually, implying that we would 
overstate the growth of labour productivity in agriculture when using employment data 
derived from the population censuses.  
                                                 
37  Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk. 
38 Jungenfelt, Löneandelen. See also Edvinsson, Growth, Accumulation, Crisis. 
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Therefore, to obtain an estimate on the growth of productivity in the agricultural sector 
we try another method based on price data. The method has been used for studying the 
evolution of labour productivity in agriculture by several authors.39 An estimate of total 
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The left-hand side of (3) is nothing but the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) as it 
is defined in the literature. Accordingly, TFP can also be measured by means of price 
data. Viewed from the side of prices, TFP is the difference between the weighted 
growth of input prices and the growth of the output price. Essentially, productivity 
growth manifests itself in increased buying power of factor incomes over final goods. 
As several authors have pointed out this is of considerable interest for economic 
historians, since we often have much better price data than data on physical volumes of 
inputs and outputs. 
To estimate the expression on the right-hand side of (3) we need data on factor 
shares. One of the authors of this article has estimated the wage share in agriculture to 
60 percent in 1913.40 According to Jungenfelt, the wage share in the agricultural sector 
(including forestries and fisheries) was 49 percent in 1913 and 70 percent in 1876–
1877.41 According to Åmark, the share of wage costs of total costs in agriculture was ‘at 
least 52 percent’.42We conclude that it seems reasonable to assume a wage share of 60 
percent for the period 1877–1913. We also need a series of prices for agricultural goods, 
agricultural wages and land rentals. The first two are readily available. We use our new 
series of sales values for private land as an indicator of land rentals. As the discussion in 
a previous section of this article has revealed, the evolution of land prices varied 
depending on the size class of farms. A calculation of TFP according to (3) should be 
most appropriate for large farms that relied on hired labour. In table 2 we present our 
estimates of TFP growth in Swedish agriculture (column 5 from the left in table 2) and 
we also present separate calculations for four different size classes.  
                                                 
39 See for example, Hoffman, Land rents and agricultural productivity. 
40 Bohlin, The income distributional consequences of agrarian tariffs. 
41 Jungenfelt, Löneandelen, pp. 248–9, table 9.  
42 Åmark, Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdena, p. 21. 
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(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
The productivity data presented in table 2 indicate that TFP grew by approximately one 
percent per year between the late 1870s and World War I. The growth figures for TFP on 
small farms seem suspiciously high. The average size of farms in the size class 5–10 
hectares was 7 hectares, while it was 20 hectares in the size class 10–50 hectares. Farms of 
these sizes were heavily reliant on family labour, especially in the smallest size class. The 
calculation of TFP from price data presupposes that all labour units are paid at the going 
market rate. It may have been the case that wages for family members at family farms did 
not increase at the same rate as those for hired labourers. Owners of family farms were 
concerned about their total income and did not bother about the extent to which it derived 
from imputed wages or land rents. In that respect productivity growth might be 
overestimated for small farms by the right-hand side of eq. (3). We also have little 
confidence in the productivity figures for farms in the size class >100 hectares, since the 
land price data for this category of farms are based on a very small sample of sales. The 
TFP figures for farms in the size class 50–100 hectares seem more reasonable. It is 
interesting to compare our calculated TFP growth rate with growth in labour productivity. 
The latter grew by 1.4 percent between 1876/78–1912/14, indicating that our TFP 
measure is not unreasonable. As we have already noted, land rentals may be overstated by 
land prices if buyers speculated in further land price increases. It is therefore of some 
comfort that our calculated TFP growth rate does not differ too much from other 
estimates based on alternative methods. For example, van Zanden gauges that the yearly 
increase in ‘total productivity’ in Swedish agriculture in 1870–1910 was 1.03 percent.43 
6.1 Commodity prices, wage costs, productivity and land rentals 
We have assembled evidence on the evolution of commodity prices, wage costs and 
agricultural productivity. Together they determined farmers’ income. To the extent that 
prices in the land market reflected income growth, they also determined land prices. An 
example may illustrate the mechanisms at work. Let us assume a farm whose sales value in 
1876/78 amounted to 100, 60 of which went to wages of agricultural labourers. Between 
1876/78 and 1912/14 agricultural commodity prices increased by 0.4 percent per year 
while agricultural productivity increased by 1.3 percent. With given factor inputs the farm’s 
                                                 
43 van Zanden, The first green revolution, p. 229, table 4. 
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revenue would have increased to 183.8 in 1912/14. At the same time wages increased by 2 
percent per year. In our farm they would have increased to 122.4 in 1912/14, leaving 61.4 
to the owner of the farm. Thus his income would have grown from 40 to 61.4 or by 1.2 per 
year between 1876/78 and 1912/14, which is also approximately the rate at which land 
prices grew in the period. Our example is of course only another way to illustrate that a 
productivity increase slightly over one percent per year was required to motivate the 
increased land prices in this period.   
7. Evidence and interpretation of the wage-rental ratio 
Our new series of land prices, showing a more rapid increase than previous series, 
flattens out the steep upturns in the Swedish wage-rental ratio that was documented by 
O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson.44 In figure 7 we display their Swedish series along 
with our two new wage-rental series, one with manufacturing and the other with 
agricultural wages in the numerator.45 All series show that wages increased faster than 
land prices, but there are some notable differences. Our series of wage-rental ratios did 
not increase nearly as much between 1877 and 1900 and during World War I as 
O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson’s series. The previous section on land prices clarified 
that they underrated the growth of land prices by using the series of Crown land leases, 
thereby overrating the increase in the wage-rental ratio. That accounts for most of the 
difference.46 
(GRAPH 7 ABOUT HERE) 
Much of the explanation of the wage-rental ratio turns on the rate at which commodity and 
factor prices rise and fall. The new series unfold that wages grew somewhat faster than land 
prices until around 1900. Then the ratio levelled off, and wages and land prices grew in 
tandem until World War I. In the inflationary conditions during the war, wages increased 
more than land prices. The interpretation of the wage-rental ratio as a measure of income 
                                                 
44 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence. 
45 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson (Factor price convergence) showed the evolution of the Swedish 
wage-rental ratio in 1870–1914. We have extended to 1926 their series of the Swedish wage-rental 
ratio which was based on Crown land leases and agricultural wages unadjusted for working hours. A 
similar extended Swedish series appeared in Williamson, Land, labor, and globalization, p. 54, table 
4. 
46 A minor part of that difference is offset by our use of a series of wages for agricultural workers that 
grows somewhat faster, because it has been adjusted to take account for reductions in working hours.  
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distribution requires caution. During inflationary conditions land prices may not be a 
representative indicator of the income of farmers and landowners. If market participants 
do not expect the surge in commodity prices to last, land prices will not increase at the 
same pace as farmers’ income, implying that the wage-rental ratio fails to represent 
accurately distributive shares. That was the case during World War I; according to the 
wage-rental ratio the lot of workers improved compared to landowners when in fact the 
opposite happened, as real wages declined because of rapid price increases of agricultural 
products. Land prices did not increase nearly as much as agricultural commodity prices 
apparently because buyers of land did not expect the inflationary conditions to last. 
Furthermore, our judgement of the wage-rental ratio depends on the wage series in use. 
Before World War I, agricultural and industrial wages tended to grow in parallel, but after 
World War I industrial wages surged ahead. Between 1877 and 1926 the wage-rental ratio 
increases by 175 percent if we use the series of industrial wages and by 55 percent if we use 
the agricultural wage series. The bifurcation of the path of hourly wages in agriculture and 
manufacturing after World War I marks a striking redistribution of power between labour 
and capital in manufacturing. In 1918–20 hourly wages rose quickly in the manufacturing 
industry along with heavy reductions in working hours. In the ensuing deflation in the 
1920s industrial wages did not fall nearly as much as industrial commodity prices. Figure 8 
shows that the increase in labour productivity was not high enough to compensate the 
owners of industrial firms for the reduction in working hours and the increase in product 
wages. The share of wages in value added expanded, which mirrors a shift in the 
distribution of power between social classes in favour of workers. It is no coincidence that 
workers managed to encroach on capital’s share of value added after the end of World War 
I, as it coincided with the introduction of universal suffrage in Sweden and revolutionary 
tendencies looming in many other European countries.47 
No similar distributional shift in favour of labour took place in agriculture. The terms 
of trade turned against agriculture in the 1920s, which made it difficult or impossible for 
landowners to grant agricultural workers wages large enough to maintain the relative wage 
gap to manufacturing. Mass unemployment and complete absence of unionisation 
weakened the bargaining powers of agricultural workers vis-à-vis landowners. Even though 
                                                 
47 Greasley and Madsen (A tale of two peripheries) found a similar dislocation of incomes in favour of 
labour in Denmark in the aftermath of World War I. They attributed most of that shift to a rise in 
labour’s bargaining power associated with trade union militancy. 
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wages sank more in absolute terms in the manufacturing sector during the deflation of 
1920s, the percentage rate of decline in wages was larger for agricultural workers. It was 
almost as large as that for agricultural products. Hence, product wages increased only 
slightly in agriculture. 
(GRAPH 8 ABOUT HERE) 
8. The Swedish wage-rental ratio in international comparison 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century mass migration, trade, and capital flows – all 
of which deserve the label Global – brought forth a factor price equalisation between 
the labour scarce but land abundant New World, and the labour abundant but land 
scarce Old World. Despite our revision of the Swedish wage-rental ratio, it still displays 
the main characteristics of an Old World country. Between 1875/79 and 1910/14 wage-
rental ratios increased in the Old World and decreased in the New World, as figure 9 
reveals. These historical trends should come as no surprise, as the historical context 
presents us with a unique case: In newly settled areas, like the US and Australia, ‘virgin 
land’ conquered from the indigenous population was transformed into private holdings 
by a soaring number of immigrants, and thereby assigned a price. Before the middle of 
the nineteenth century, land was practically free or could be purchased at very low 
prices. Eventually the frontier was closed and the land to labour ratio decreased. At the 
same time the transport revolution opened up the world to exports of agrarian products 
from the newly settled territories. Hence the price of land rose rapidly from very low 
levels.48 
(GRAPH 9 ABOUT HERE) 
In the Old World the invasion of cheap grain brought about a fall in income for land 
owners, which provoked political reactions. Land owners rallied for protectionist 
interventions in order to stem the flow of cheap grain from the New World. Tariffs were 
raised in a number of countries, notably France and Germany while others, like Britain, 
Ireland and Denmark, adhered to free trade. O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, in their 
                                                 
48 It may be of some interest to compare farmland prices in the USA and Sweden. Using official 
exchange rates, in 1870 farmland prices on plain-lands in Southern and Central Sweden (in the 
counties of Östergötland and Skaraborg) were more than five times higher than in the US. Still in 
1910, they were more than two times higher. See Åmark, Undersökning angående 
jordegendomsvärdena, pp. 789, table A; Lindert, Long-run trends, pp. 49–51, table 1. 
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article on factor price convergence, put either a free trade or a protectionist label on the 
countries in the Old World sample and found that free trade countries’ wage-rental ratios 
increased faster than protectionist countries’, thus indicating that tariffs mitigated the 
negative influences of cheap grain on land prices. Sweden was given a free trade label 
despite evidence presented showing that it had a high rate of protection.49 The argument 
for putting a free trade label on Sweden anyway was that the country went protectionist 
relatively late. We cannot approve of that argumentation: the free-trade era in Sweden 
ended in 1888, only three years after most of the other Old World countries erected their 
tariffs.50 If protectionism mattered in these countries, it mattered in Sweden too.  
The first steps towards a protectionist trade regime in Sweden were taken in 1888 when 
custom duties were reinstalled on agrarian and food products, above all on bread-grain and 
flour. Tariffs came to range over a wide array of agricultural, food and industrial products, 
while raw materials were generally free from protection. For most of the years after 1888, 
the rate of nominal protection for bread-grain varied between 20 and 40 percent.51 It 
granted Swedish farmers higher incomes than what would have prevailed in a free trade 
world. Animal products received some protection as well, but it was of little consequence 
since the most important animal product, milk, was unprotected.52 The turnaround in trade 
policy probably slowed down the transition from arable to animal production in Swedish 
agriculture, but it did not change its general line of direction.  
 (GRAPH 10 ABOUT HERE) 
If Sweden should be classified as a protectionist country, why did its wage-rental ratio 
behave similarly to the free world countries, as O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson showed? 
The answer is that it did not, if we use our new series of land prices in the denominator of 
the wage-rental ratio. Figure 10 unveils that instead it moves more in a fashion resembling 
France, Germany and Spain. However, the link between the evolution of the wage-rental 
                                                 
49 O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, Factor price convergence, p. 504. 
50 O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, ch. 6. 
51 Bohlin, Tariff protection in Sweden. 
52 Fresh milk enjoyed a high natural protection anyway since it was not transportable over long 
distances, but milk was primarily used for making butter. Therefore, since butter enjoyed tariff 
protection, it may be argued that milk was indirectly protected. However, butter was an important 
export product at the time and Swedish butter prices followed closely the world market price for 
butter as argued by Jörberg (History of Prices in Sweden, II, p. 211), so the butter tariff was largely 
inconsequential. 
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ratio and protectionism is questionable in the case of Sweden. Tariffs on bread-grain raised 
domestic prices of bread-grain above the world market level but they did not affect prices 
of the most important animal products significantly, most of which were non-tradable. 
Prices of animal products developed more favourably, and demand for them was more 
income elastic. A transition towards more animal products would have boosted land prices 
in a free trade world too. 
Some simple calculations may illustrate the relative importance of price movements and 
volume changes for the growth of nominal income in agriculture. The rate of growth of 
output in current prices is the sum of the growth rates of volumes and prices. Table 3 
shows that total agricultural output grew by two percent per annum in current values 
between1876/78 and 1912/14, 30 percent of which was accounted for by price increases 
and 70 percent by volume growth. At the same time, farmers changed their product mix in 
the direction of more animal produce. In 1876/78 about 50 percent of the output 
consisted of arable products, in 1912/14 it had contracted to 25 percent. For animal 
products, the proportion of current value growth accounted for by volume changes was 72 
percent, while it was slightly less for arable products. A coarse calculation may shed some 
light on the importance of grain tariffs for nominal income growth in arable products. If 
we assume that prices of arable products had been 25 percent lower in 1912/14 without 
tariff protection than they actually were, nominal output growth in agriculture would have 
been reduced by roughly 0.25 percent per annum, assuming unchanged product mix. In 
other words, the agricultural growth rate would have been reduced by one-eighth. We 
conclude that the most important factor behind nominal income growth in agriculture after 
the protectionist turn in trade policy in 1888 was volume increases and, to a minor extent, 
price increases in animal products.  
 (TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
To sum up, industrialisation, especially from the 1890s onwards, set Sweden on a rapid and 
sustainable growth track, which spurred demand for more income elastic products. Wages 
for industrial workers accompanied productivity advances in industry, and wages for 
agricultural workers followed suit. Owners of large farm lands could bear the burden of 
rapid wages by increasing productivity and switching to animal products. For smaller 
farmers, commonly more committed to animal production, rapid wage increases did not 
affect their profitability much as they did not rely to any great extent on hired labour.  




This article joins the stream of recent attempts to increase our knowledge of movements in 
relative factor prices, with its focus set upon the Swedish wage-rental ratio between 1876 
and 1926, in light of the wider historiography of Globalisation and factor price 
convergence. We set out initially to document a new series of private land prices in 1877–
1926. The new series, in contrast to a series based on Crown land leases used by other 
authors, fell by a smaller magnitude during the agrarian crises in the 1880s and increased 
faster after the turn of the century. A corollary of the new series of land prices is a new 
picture of the wage-rental ratio, a measure supposedly indicating trends in income 
distribution. In contrast to earlier evidence, showing that the Swedish wage-rental ratio 
increased rapidly in 1870–1914, our new wage-rental ratio exhibits a much slower increase. 
This is interesting as industrialisation which sets in motion powerful forces of 
accumulation tend to put the wage-rental ratio on an upward track. Sweden enjoyed rapid 
and sustainable economic growth from the 1870s onwards, which means that a priori we 
should expect the wage-rental ratio to increase. Our documentation of a more reluctant 
increase of the new wage-rental ratio than previous thought highlights the very good 
conditions for agriculture. Rapid productivity advances in agriculture and favourable prices, 
especially for animal products, boosted land prices.  
Historical trends in wage-rental ratios have figured massively in discussions of 
Globalisation and its impact on relative factor price movements in the land scarce but 
labour abundant Old World, and the land abundant but labour scarce New World in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding our revision of the wage-rental 
ratio, the Old World label still fits Sweden comfortably well: the wage-rental ratio 
increased in Sweden and other Old World countries and decreased in the New World. 
The revised Swedish wage-rental ratio, in contrast to the previous one, behaves more 
like wage-rental ratios in the protectionist countries than in the free trade countries in 
the Old World. That view is consistent with the Swedish protectionist turn in 1888. 
However, while farmers gained from grain tariffs, their income growth had more to do 
with a change in their product mix from arable to animal products. Real output increases 
and favourable nominal price movements of animal products served to raise land prices 
a lot more than tariffs on bread grain did.  




Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik, D. Fabriker och manufakturer. 
Bagge, G., Lundberg, E. and Svennilson, I. (1933) Wages in Sweden 1860–1930. Part One 
(Stockholm: Sockholm Economic Studies). 
Bagge, G., Lundberg, E. and Svennilson, I. (1933) Wages in Sweden 1860–1930. Part Two 
(Stockholm: Sockholm Economic Studies). 
Berglund, B. (1982) Industriarbetarklassens formering: arbete och teknisk förändring vid tre svenska 
fabriker under 1800-talet (Göteborg: Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, Göteborgs 
universitet). 
Bohlin, J. (2005) Tariff protection in Sweden, 1885–1914. Scandinavian Economic History 
Review, 53: 7–29. 
Bohlin, J. (2006) The income distributional consequences of agrarian tariffs in Sweden on 
the eve of World War I, Göteborg papers in Economic History, 6, (Göteborg: 
Department of Economic History, Göteborg University). 
Cornell, L. (1982) Sundsvallsdistriktets sågverksarbetare 1860–1913: arbete, levnadsförhållanden, 
rekrytering (Göteborg: Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, Göteborgs universitet). 
Edvinsson, R. (2005) Growth, Accumulation, Crisis: with New Macroeconomic Data for Sweden 
1800–2000 (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Economic History 41). 
Federico, G. (2005) Feeding the World: an Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). 
Gadd, C.-J. (2005) The agricultural revolution in Sweden, ca 1700–1900. In M. Jerneck, M. 
Mörner, G. Tortella and S. Åkerman, eds. Different Paths to Modernity. A Nordic and 
Spanish perspective (Lund: Nordic Academic Press). 
Greasley, D. and Madsen, J. (2006) A tale of two peripheries: real wages in Denmark and 
New Zeeland, 1875–1939. Paper presented to the Asia/Pacific Economic and 
Business History Conference, 16–18 February 2006, Brisbane. 
Greasley, D. and Oxley, L. (2005) Refrigeration and distribution: New Zeeland land Prices 
and real wages 1873–1939. Australian Economic History Review, 45: 23–44. 
Gustafsson, B. (1965) Den norrländska sågverksindustrins arbetare 1890–1913: arbets- och 
levnadsförhållanden (Stockholm: Almquist&Wicksell). 
Gustafsson, B. (1996) The industrial revolution in Sweden. In M. Teich and R. Porter, eds. 
The industrial revolution in national context. Europe and the USA (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Hoffman, P. T. (1991) Land rents and agricultural productivity: the Paris basin, 1450–1789. 
Journal of Economic History, 51: 771–805. 
Höijer, E. (1930) P.M. angående jordegendomsvärdenas förändringar fram till år 1928. 
Riksdagens protokoll 1930. Bihang. Saml. 11. Nr 2. Bil. A. 
Johansson, C. (1988) Glasarbetarna 1860–1910: arbete, levnadsförhållanden och facklig verksamhet 
vid Kosta och andra glasbruk under industrialismens inledningsskede (Göteborg: Ekonomisk-
historiska institutionen, Göteborgs universitet). 
Jungenfelt, K. G. (1959) Lönernas andel av nationalinkomsten: En studie över vissa sidor av 
inkomstfördelningens utveckling i Sverige. Uppsala University. 
Jan Bohlin and Svante Larsson: Protectionism, agricultural prices and relative factor incomes 
 
25 
Jungenfelt, K. G. (1966) Löneandelen och den ekonomiska utvecklingen. En empirisk-teoretisk studie 
(Uppsala: Almqvist & Wicksell). 
Jörberg, L. (1972) A history of prices in Sweden 1732–1914. Volume I Sources, Methods Tables. 
(Lund: Gleerup). 
Jörberg, L. (1972) A History of Prices in Sweden 1732–1914. Volume II Description, Analysis 
(Lund: Gleerup). 
Kaldor, N. (1961) Capital accumulation and economic growth. In F. Lutz and D. C. Hague, 
eds. The Theory of Capital: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic 
Association (New York: St Martins Press). 
Larsson, S. (2005) Globalisation, inequality and Swedish catch up in the late nineteeenth 
century: Williamson’s real wage comparisons under scrutiny, Göteborg Papers in 
Economic History, 2, (Göteborg: Department of Economic History, Göteborg 
University). 
Larsson, S. (2006) Estimates of employment in Swedish manufacturing, 1868–1912, 
(Göteborg: Department of Economic History, Göteborg University). 
Lindahl, E., Dahlgren, E. and Kock, K. (1937) National Income of Sweden 1861–1930. Part 
Two (Stockholm: Norstedt). 
Lindert, P. H. (1974) Land scarcity and American economic growth. Journal of Economic 
History, 34: 851–84. 
Lindert, P. H. (1988) Long-run trends in American farmland values. Agricultural History, 62: 
45–85. 
Ljungberg, J. (1990) Priser och marknadskrafter i Sverige 1885–1969. En prishistorisk studie 
(Lund: Ekonomisk-historiska föreningen i Lund). 
O’Rourke, K. H., Taylor, A. M. and Williamson, J. G. (1996) Factor price convergence in 
the late nineteenth century. International Economic Review, 37: 499–530. 
O’Rourke, K. H. and Williamson, J. G. (1999) Globalization and History: the Evolution of a 
Nineteenth century Atlantic economy (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press). 
Schön, L. (1988) Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Industri och hantverk (Lund: 
Ekonomisk-historiska föreningen). 
Schön, L. (1995) Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk med binäringar 1800–1980 
(Lund: Ekonomisk-historiska föreningen i Lund). 
van Zanden, J. L. (1991) The first green revolution: the growth of production and 
productivity in European agriculture, 1870–1914. Economic History Review, 44: 215–
39. 
Williamson, J. G. (1995) The evolution of global labor markets since 1830: background 
evidence and hypotheses. Explorations in Economic History, 32: 141–96. 
Williamson, J. G. (2002) Land, labor, and globalization in the Third World, 1870–1940. 
Journal of Economic History, 62: 55–85. 
Åmark, K. (1923) Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdenas utveckling i Sverige och vissa 
främmande länder (Stockholm: SOU 1923:45). 
 
Göteborg Papers in Economic History no. 7 
 
26 
Tables and graphs 
TABLE 1. Distribution of agricultural workers in Sweden, 1870/80 and 1920/30 (%) 
 Farm servants Day workers Statare 
1870/80 49 46 5 
1920/30 39 50 11 
Source: Jungenfelt, Löneandelen, pp. 106–8. 
TABLE 2. Growth in total factor productivity and labour productivity in Swedish agriculture, 1876/78–
1912/14 (% p.a.) 
Hectare size of farm unit   




1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Sources: Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk, table J19; Åmark, Undersökning 
angående jordegendomsvärdena; www.historia.se. 
TABLE 3. Growth in current values of output in agriculture (% p.a.), decomposed into volume changes 
and price changes, 1876/78–1912/14  
  Precentage share accounted for by: 
 Growth Price changes Volume changes 
Agriculture 2.1 30 70 
Animal products 3.2 28 72 
Arable products 0.1 34 66 
Source: Unpublished data of arable and animal output in fixed and current prices, provided by Lennart 
Schön. 
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Note: In 1877–1919, the series of private land prices are based on averages for three years. Linear 
interpolations fill the remaining gaps. Thus the first year is actually the average of 1876–78. 
Sources: Crown land leases: Lindahl et al., National Income, II, p. 393, table 126. Private land prices: In 
1877–1919, a weighted measure based on series from Åmark, Undersökning angående 
jordegendomsvärdena, pp. 78–89. In 1919–1926, Höijer, P.M. angående jordegendomsvärdenas 
förändringar fram till år 1928, p. 121. 












Note: Based on averages for three years. Linear interpolations fill the remaining gaps. Thus the first year is 
actually the average of 1876–8. 
Sources: Åmark, Undersökning angående jordegendomsvärdena, pp. 80–9. 
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1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Annual wages Hourly wages
 
Note: The wage gap was estimated for a benchmark in 1877.  
Sources: Manufacturing: hourly and annual wages, Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I, pp. 
260–1, table 26. Agriculture: hourly wages, Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, II, p. 
113, table 169, and p. 152, table 180; annual wages, Jungenfelt, Lönernas andel av nationalinkomsten, 
pp. 106-7 







1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Animal prices/Vegetable prices
 
Source: Unpublished series by Lennart Schön, provided by the author on request. 
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1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Terms of trade agriculture/industry
 
Sources: Agricultural prices: Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Jordbruk (table J1 and table 
J6). Industrial prices: in 1877–1912 Larsson, Estimates of employment; in 1912–26, Edvinsson, 
Growth, Accumulation, Crisis, www.historia.se. 










Source: See figure 1 and figure 5. 
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1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Wage-Rental ratio, O'Rourke et. al
Wage-Rental ratio, industrial wages
Wage-Rental ratio, agricultural wages
 
Note: O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson’s ratio is computed by dividing agricultural wages by Crown land 
leases. Our new wage-rental ratios are computed by dividing either agricultural wages, adjusted for 
working hours, or manufacturing wages, by private land prices. 
Sources:  See figure 1 and figure 3. 







1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Product wage/Labour productivity
 
Sources: Value added from Schön, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Industri, pp. 308–9, table I14. 
Employment: Larsson, Estimates of employment; Edvinsson, Growth, Accumulation, Crisis, 
www.historia.se. Wages: Bagge, Lundberg and Svennilson, Wages in Sweden, I, pp. 260–1, table 26. 
Deflator: see Figure 5.  
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Note: Old World countries: Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. New World countries: 
Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. 
Sources: New and Old World countries: Williamson, Land, labor, and globalization, pp. 73–4. table 2 and 3. 
We have included in the New World sample data for New Zealand from Greasley and Oxley, 
Refrigeration and distribution, data appendix. Sweden: our new wage-rental ratio with industrial 
wages in the numerator.  
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Note: Protectionist countries: France, Germany and Spain. Free trade countries: Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark. 
Sources: Protectionist and free trade countries: Williamson, Land, labor, and globalization, pp. 73–4, table 2 
and 3. Sweden: our new wage-rental ratio with industrial wages in the numerator.  




Land values for private land and Crown land, 1877–1926 (1913=100) 
 Private land  
 Size class, hectares  
 5-10  10-50  50-100  100- Average Crown land 
1877 71 67 73 87 75 125 
1878 69 66 71 86 73 113 
1879 67 64 69 84 72 99 
1880 65 63 67 83 70 97 
1881 66 64 66 83 70 100 
1882 67 64 65 83 70 97 
1883 69 65 65 83 70 94 
1884 67 65 62 82 69 90 
1885 66 64 59 82 67 86 
1886 65 64 56 81 66 82 
1887 62 62 57 79 65 79 
1888 58 60 58 77 64 81 
1889 55 58 59 74 63 80 
1890 59 58 58 77 63 76 
1891 63 57 58 79 63 76 
1892 67 56 58 81 63 82 
1893 66 58 59 86 64 94 
1894 65 59 59 90 66 84 
1895 64 60 60 96 67 83 
1896 63 63 59 91 67 77 
1897 62 65 57 87 67 76 
1898 60 68 56 84 67 74 
1899 62 69 59 83 68 78 
1900 64 70 62 83 70 76 
1901 66 70 64 82 72 78 
1902 72 72 70 84 75 75 
1903 78 74 75 86 78 90 
1904 84 76 81 88 82 95 
1905 87 78 81 90 83 96 
1906 90 79 80 91 84 99 
1907 93 81 79 93 85 93 
1908 93 83 81 94 86 91 
1909 94 84 83 95 88 89 
1910 94 86 84 96 89 92 
1911 96 90 89 97 93 96 
1912 98 95 94 99 96 101 
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1914 111 111 105 113 110 105 
1915 124 122 111 127 121 109 
1916 138 135 117 144 133 111 
1917 155 150 136 154 150 122 
1918 169 166 158 165 167 127 
1919 193 184 185 176 190 147 
1920     214 148 
1921     178 160 
1922     164 156 
1923     159 146 
1924     162 145 
1925     161 145 
1926     160 158 
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